

**REVIEW OF**  
**PROJECT [REDACTED]**

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**A. Problem:**

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1. To determine whether or not Project [REDACTED] should be continued and, if continued, in what form.

**B. Background:**

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2. Project [REDACTED] had its inception, in 1954, following acceptance of the idea that a closer relationship and better understanding between CIA and the military was essential to accomplishing effective coordination in the field in time of war. The resultant course was designed to give the military a more complete and accurate picture of the mission, organization and functions of the Agency, with special reference to war planning and CIA support of the military in wartime. As the threat of war receded and relations between the Agency and the military establishment in other areas of mutual interest grew closer, the original purpose of the course was gradually altered and the course content broadened in an effort to give selected military representatives greater understanding of the organization and functions of the Agency and to create better appreciation of how the Agency and the military services can provide mutual support in peace as well as in varying degrees of war. Unspoken was the basic desire to develop among the military a more responsive and cooperative attitude with a view to facilitating the Agency mission at all times.

3. This project has offered ten annual two-week courses for officers of all services selected from the continental and overseas commands and various Defense colleges, plus four special two-day courses for officers drawn from the JCS and the DIA. The course scheduled for the fall of 1962 was cancelled because of the Cuban crisis, and the one originally planned for October 1965 has been deferred until the project has been reviewed and an agreed CIA position on its future has been reached. Inasmuch as the JCS request four months' lead time to notify the appropriate military commands and schools and permit of the selection of suitable participants, a decision should be had not later than 10 December if a course is to be offered in mid-April 1966, as is tentatively planned.

4. The ten two-week courses offered thus far have been attended by 364 Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps officers. This figure is broken down by service as follows: Army, 135; Air Force, 105; Navy, 77; Marine Corps, 52; Participants included two Brigadier Generals; 154 Colonels and Navy Captains; 139 Lt. Colonels and Commanders; 51 Majors and Lt. Commanders. In addition, five selected civilian employees of the Defense establishment also

participated, making a grand total of 369 (this figure does not include participants in the four two-day [REDACTED] briefing sessions which have been offered in the last two or three years). 25X1A2g

25X1A2g 5. Project [REDACTED] has in the past been enthusiastically supported by the DCI, the DDCI and other senior Agency officials. This has been in line with the Agency desire to assure cross-fertilization within the intelligence community and to educate responsible Government representatives to the Agency role, capabilities and limitations.

6. Participant reaction has in general been highly favorable and many of the officers attending have judged the course "outstanding." Individual comments made at the end of each course have regularly been taken into account in the preparation of the succeeding course, with the result that continued improvement has been noted in course content and presentation. Without exception the 43 officers, drawn from nine different organizations and six different commands, who attended the most recent two-week [REDACTED] course concluded that it had provided them valuable information which they could use to good advantage in their day-to-day tasks and which would enhance their ability to work with CIA representatives in matters of mutual interest. On the CIA side it was felt that the officers in attendance had left with a much better understanding of, and a more favorable attitude toward, the Agency. 25X1A2g

7. The favorable response of the military has been reflected not only in the student critiques but also in recent inquiries by the Office of the JCS as to the dates for the next course, by queries regarding it from overseas commands, and by requests from individual officers to attend. The DIA assessment of the value of Project [REDACTED] is reflected in their decision to offer an orientation course on their mission, organization and activities which they have imitatively called Project [REDACTED] and to which they have requested CIA to send representatives. 25X1A2g 25X1A2g

### C. Discussion

8. The advisability of continuing Project [REDACTED] at all, or at least in its present form, has been questioned on two grounds: 25X1A2g

a. Do the results justify the effort, especially as regards the expenditure of time by senior CIA officials in the preparation and presentation of their talks?

b. Does the project constitute a significant and unacceptable erosion of security?

9. In the absence of any yardstick by which to measure the advantages and disadvantages of this project, answers to both these questions must be largely subjective. There are, however, certain facts and some informed opinion which can together contribute to the formation of reasonably objective conclusions on both counts.

10. It is quite true that past [REDACTED] courses have drawn extensively on senior CIA officials, from the DCI on down. Actual participating time, not including time spent in preparation, has run from 20 to 50 minutes for the DCI (or the DDCI) to 50 minutes for the DDP and 40 minutes for Division and Staff chiefs. This, of course, is without reference to the considerable number of man-hours expended by OTR, WPS and other components in planning and conducting the program.

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11. It is self-evident that a program of this scope requires a rather substantial effort if the desired results are to be achieved - that they have been achieved there can be little doubt, as will be illustrated later. Not so clear, however, is the extent to which our effort can be diminished, and the participation of top Agency officials curtailed, without prejudice to the course. We know from student critiques, as well as from unsolicited comments by participants in previous [REDACTED] courses, that one of the things which has created the greatest impact on the officers in attendance has been the caliber of CIA leadership as reflected by the senior Agency officials who have addressed them. To the extent that we wish to project the most favorable image of the Agency and develop confidence among the military that CIA is well and effectively led by highly-qualified, competent and devoted officers, it would appear counterproductive to water down too much our past high-level participation. We believe, nevertheless, that the burden of such participation can be eased somewhat through a modification of the project along lines to be discussed below.

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12. As for the "erosion" of security, there is something to be said on both sides. It can be argued, as it has been argued, that the officers attending

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██████████ have been given a broader and more comprehensive view of the Agency than is true of many Agency employees, that they have become familiar with the names and faces of a considerable number of Agency personnel, that they have sometimes been provided more comprehensive and more detailed information than they need for their present or likely future assignments in the military establishment. It could also be argued that some of the officer participants have not been selected on the basis of assignments clearly requiring knowledge of, or involving a close working relationship with, CIA; that others have left such assignments soon after attending a ██████████ course; that a certain number of these officers have already retired; and that still others have been, are now, or may in future find themselves in situations entailing the possibility of capture and hostile interrogation.

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13. On the other hand, our inquiries in appropriate quarters have yet to disclose a single instance where an officer who has attended a ██████████ course has been known - or suspected - to have been guilty of any breach of security involving the Agency. On the contrary, it appears that officers attending ██████████ have, after the course, frequently demonstrated increased appreciation of and concern for the security of Agency personnel and activities. Indeed, the record shows that cooperative and knowledgeable officers in the military establishment, including some who have attended ██████████, have added to rather than detracted from the security of CIA operations and personnel. It would seem reasonable to expect that intelligent and loyal American officers, with appropriate clearances and proper briefings, would help to protect our security, or at least do nothing to undermine it. And unless we badly misread human nature, people who are shown respect and confidence are much more prone to cooperate than those who are kept at a distance. It is our view, supported by numerous reactions we have had in the course of our survey, that CIA in general and the Clandestine Services in particular have gained, and stand to gain in the future, from a judicious orientation of selected representatives of the military establishment. For us the question is not whether ██████████ should be continued but rather how it can best be modified to achieve optimum results at minimum cost in time and exposure.

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14. To return to the extent of the details provided ██████████ participants on CIA organization and activities, the degree of "erosion" of security may, considering the wealth of information on the Agency already in the public domain, be much less than has been imagined. On the other hand, and in the

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light of the great amount of misinformation included in the outpourings of the U. S. and foreign press, we believe there is much merit to correcting, whenever feasible, the sadly distorted picture which a great many Americans, not excluding the military, have of CIA. Project [REDACTED] offering a captive audience of basically well-motivated officers who now or in future can exert a leavening effect at middle and upper echelons of the Armed Forces, provides a valuable forum susceptible of correcting the frequently erroneous perspective held by a large segment of the U. S. military establishment scarcely less than by the public at large. We have concluded, on the strength of comments made by participants in former [REDACTED] courses, that their eyes have indeed been opened and that they have left with a much clearer - and much more favorable - view of the Agency.

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15. With a view not only to diminishing the real or fancied erosion of certain facets of our security but also to enhancing that security in other ways, we believe the [REDACTED] course can be tailored so as to illustrate dramatically the damage to the national interest which can be shown to have resulted from careless indiscretions and petty but mischievous gossip as well as from deliberate and malicious attempts to embarrass the Agency and the U. S. Government. We have in mind concrete examples, appropriately sanitized case studies, discussion and up-dating of the "communist forgeries" with emphasis on the Soviet disinformation program and Communist efforts to discredit the Agency, and other things which might profitably be presented to a group of this kind, in the guise of an authoritative and impressive "inside story" perhaps not going in fact much beyond what has already been published. In the process of appearing to take these officers fully into our confidence - at the same time emphasizing the compartmentation and need-to-know principles which characterize our activities - we are confident that we can not only assure more effective protection of our security interests but even lay the groundwork for the active collaboration of selected officers in situations which may in future lend themselves to this purpose. Indeed, Project [REDACTED] if suitably followed up, might well constitute the basis for a valuable co-option program within the military establishment.

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16. In reviewing this project we have examined the lists of past participants with a view to determining, insofar as feasible without requesting a complete rundown from the military, their subsequent assignments and current status. This necessarily partial check shows that at least thirteen [REDACTED] graduates now hold general or flag rank. It also reflects that a large number (approximating at least a hundred) now hold staff or command positions where their greater familiarity with the Agency not only should be valuable to them but might well prove of distinct value to CIA.

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17. We have solicited from knowledgeable Agency officers comments on such [redacted] alumni as are personally known to them. A score of these officers have provided detailed comments on approximately 90 [redacted] graduates. Of this number, they concluded that at least 51 could be regarded as helpful friends of the Agency, a fact which they ascribed in considerable part to their [redacted] orientation. On five of the remaining nine, mixed views were held, whereas only four were regarded as unfriendly and uncooperative.

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18. Among the CIA officers with whom we have discussed [redacted] on the basis of their direct participation in the program and/or their close association with [redacted] graduates, we have found that the great majority are strongly in favor of continuing the course, convinced as they are that it is in the Agency interest to do so. Of 13 present or past Senior War Planners (or Agency representatives at U.S. Military commands) from whom we have thus far received answers to our inquiries, only two have questioned the value of continuing the project. One of them felt that the officers attending [redacted] were "apathetic" both during and after the course (we have found no one else who shares this impression). The other, believing the admitted value of [redacted] not to be commensurate with the effort which goes into it, has recommended that one last (and more restricted) [redacted] course be given in 1966 after which he suggests that the Agency limit itself to providing individual briefings of key military personnel at Headquarters and in the field. All the others, without exception, have favored continuing [redacted] more or less in its present form.

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19. For the purposes of this review, we have not attached undue importance to the highly favorable comments made by the overwhelming majority of the [redacted] students in their critiques at the end of the course. We believe to be of greater significance the observations subsequently volunteered independently by a number of participant military officers; of these we cite (Annex A) numerous specific examples which reflect the value of [redacted] to the participants and, directly or indirectly, to the Agency.

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20. Of special significance are the comments of an Army and Marine officer who, having attended Project [redacted], are now on detail to the Agency: 25X1A2g

a. "The course was professionally run and left a fine impression on the attendees . . . CIA should set the criteria for attendance. . . .

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Project [REDACTED] should continue. . . . If it is decided to discontinue the Project, then a suitable visitor's program should be established as a substitute and on a continuing basis." (Col. Albert C. Davies, USA)

b. "As a recent graduate, I feel that my misconceptions and misapprehensions about CIA were corrected by the application of truth and candor without giving me much more than I had already guessed or read in the public domain as to CIA structure and role. . . . I was deeply impressed by the rank of CIA speakers as clear evidence of my reception as a first-class citizen. However, a bare sprinkling of senior staffers would present the same impression. . . . On my return from the Project, I submitted a written brief to Brig. Gen. L. A. Hall, USAF, J-2, USEUCOM which concluded with a strong recommendation that J-2 seek as many slots as often as possible for appropriate intelligence staff officers. . . . I am able to attest that my own security consciousness took a notable spurt after the course and I found myself counseling co-workers when I thought they erred. . . . As to a general assessment of the impact of [REDACTED] on CIA-Defense relationships, I would say it has performed a vital service. In my year with USEUCOM, I saw wide evidence of resentment against and lack of understanding of CIA. Arguments for this attitude presented to me were persuasive. Only after attending the course did I clearly understand CIA, its place in the national scheme and the futility of resentment based on parochialism. . . . I have every confidence that there would be widespread resentment should the program be abandoned. . . . It must also be remembered that military selectees, by and large, are or will inevitably be planners and most of them at high levels. Their understanding of CIA's side of the coin in such assignments, whether or not they would be directly concerned with CIA affairs, can have immense significance. I would conclude by remembering that our plans for active military operations find CIA to one degree or another subordinate to Defense elements. I would hate to see the educational process begin for the military when the bell rings." (Col. David A. Brewster, USMC).

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21. The comments made by Agency officers regarding military participants in [REDACTED] (Annex A) and by two [REDACTED] attendees now detailed to the Agency (paragraph 20) give a clearer idea of the value and importance of this project to the Agency in the field than can be had from less direct assessment. In addition, however, the more general observations made by a number of quite senior CIA field officers, based on their close association with [REDACTED] and many of its graduates, also merit close attention; these are set forth in Annex B hereto.

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**D. Conclusions**

**22. On the basis of all the facts and informed opinion we have acquired thus far, we conclude that:**

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**b. To terminate the project would definitely be prejudicial to CIA, and especially to the Clandestine Services, in that it would, voluntarily, bring to an end a long-standing and well-established program which, in educating selected military officers to the role, capabilities and limitations of the Agency, has succeeded in marked degree in obtaining their understanding and support.**

**c. Further, the termination of Project [REDACTED] would not be understood by the military, but would be widely interpreted as a defensive withdrawal by CIA in its role as leader of the intelligence community.**

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**d. The effort expended in this program, including that made by top Agency officials, is not excessive in terms of the results achieved. At the same time it should be possible to revise [REDACTED] in such a way as to reduce this effort, and the demands on our top officers, without prejudice to the program.**

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**e. If on the one hand there may be at least some theoretical erosion of CIA security, there are also clear indications that in certain respects and specific instances our security has actually been enhanced. Again, however, it should be possible to revise [REDACTED] in such a way as to reduce any real erosion of security and simultaneously to increase the security consciousness and effectiveness of [REDACTED] participants.**

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25X1A2g      **f. Although Project [REDACTED] has produced demonstrably worthwhile results, it is susceptible of more effective exploitation. Considering the effort which goes into it, and its potentially greater value to the Agency, it warrants even more careful preparation and follow-up in the future.**

**E. Recommendations**

**23. We submit herewith the following recommendations:**

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b. Schedule the next course for III - 22 April 1966, and so advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to give them the 120 days lead time they have requested.

c. Establish more specific criteria, including current or scheduled assignments involving close and frequent contact with Agency representatives, for the selection of military participants.

d. Prepare a carefully revised curriculum designed to reduce top-level Agency participation, avoid discussion of operationally sensitive subjects, otherwise improve the security of the course, and enlist the more active support of the participants in matters affecting the Agency.

e. Keep track of [REDACTED] graduates with a view to developing selected officers, especially overseas, and capitalizing on their positions, good will and Agency orientation, in some cases in a co-opted status, to further CIA (especially CS) interests and needs.

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**ANNEX A**

**Comments by Agency Officers  
on Selected [REDACTED] Alumni**

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The following comments on the [REDACTED] alumni named are derived from communications we have received from the CIA officer or officers indicated at the end of each comment.

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a. Lt. Colonel William P. Adams, Jr., member of the J-3 Special Warfare Branch of CINCPAC responsible for handling military codeword correspondence between CINCPAC and SACSA, JCS, was very well informed regarding CIA and was sympathetic and understanding of our peculiar problems and requirements. Extremely security conscious, he was considered a very good friend of the Agency. He kept the [REDACTED] Station very closely informed of military matters about which the Station needed to know. He was an officer whose friendship and assistance were valued highly. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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[REDACTED]

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c. Lt. Colonel Manuel Chavez has always been completely cooperative with the Agency, perhaps to the detriment of his career with his parent service at times. In his current assignment with CINCSOUTH he handles many aspects of relations with CIA, with which he remains completely cooperative. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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d. Colonel Richard K. Catterlin played a key role in a sensitive intelligence liaison and proved to be very cooperative. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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e. Brigadier General Raymond G. Davis, J-2 of the Marine Corps, was a great friend of the Agency who had his horizons broadened for him in [REDACTED] and worked closely and cooperatively with SWPE during his assignment in J-2 EUCOM. (Messrs. [REDACTED])

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[REDACTED]

l. Colonel Immanuel Klette was extremely cooperative and understanding of the CIA role during his assignment with CINCSOUTH in 1962 - 1963. He assisted the [REDACTED] Station in numerous ways, with alacrity and discretion. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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m. "Colonel E. R. McLean ..., Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Plans section and Colonel D. S. Grones ..., the Subordinate Command Planning Officer [of LANTCOM] ..., both work closely with [REDACTED] on plans which require CIA support or support to CIA and both have been very cooperative ... from comments made by these officers, their understanding of the capabilities and limitations of CIA was enhanced considerably by [REDACTED] ... both felt the project was worthwhile in providing a better understanding and appreciation of CIA's role." Both thought [REDACTED] would be improved by cutting it to one week; eliminating details of CIA organization; providing more specific examples of areas of mutual cooperation between CIA and the military, with indications as to how such cooperation could be extended and improved; not slighting CIA limitations in eagerness to expound CIA capabilities; having some top-level officers appear for protocol requirements but not parading the heads of departments, concentrating instead on lectures and demonstrations of direct interest to CIA-military relationships. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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n. Colonel George T. Metcalf, SACSA, JCS, has conveyed the impression that Project [REDACTED] gave him a great deal of information about Agency capabilities of value to him in his present position. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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o. Lt. Colonel David Ofner was extremely cooperative and friendly to CIA during his tour as A-2, SOUTHCOM and was particularly flattering of Project [REDACTED] upon his return from attending a [REDACTED] course. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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25X1C p. In a series of contacts with a CIA staff officer in [REDACTED] in 1960 - 1961, Colonel John F. Splain proved to be notably understanding, cooperative and discreet in carrying out his role in the sensitive matter of a serious [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The affair was successfully concluded, thanks in part to his assistance. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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q. Captain Walter K. Stow, USN, showed outstanding cooperation and respect for Agency security problems over a two-year period of daily contact with a CIA staff officer in [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED])

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r. Lt. Colonel Jack Tallerdar, formerly with SOTFE and now at Fort Bragg, understands our UW planning concepts, is very friendly to the Agency, and has frequently mentioned the help which Project [REDACTED] was to him in understanding his military UW planning tasks. (Messrs. [REDACTED])

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s. Navy Captain Joseph Z. Taylor, now Deputy Chief of AID's Vietnam desk, is a strong supporter of the Agency; he has mentioned the impact that [REDACTED] has on military officers in preparing them for joint staff responsibilities and opening their eyes to the role CIA has in national security matters. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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t. Lt. Colonel William V. Wilson observed how valuable the [REDACTED] course would be to him in his work as a J-3 staff officer at STRICOM. He has a very fine understanding of our UW concepts and was always extremely cooperative. (Mr. [REDACTED])

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**ANNEX B**

**Observations by Senior CIA Officers  
on the Value of [REDACTED]**

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The following observations as to the value of [REDACTED] have been made by the senior CIA officers indicated:

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a. "All of the officers with whom we've talked in the past, were very much impressed with the rank and caliber of the speakers. . . . There has been considerable interest on the part of present USEUCOM officers regarding the next running of [REDACTED]. We know of three or four who are anxious to get a billet when [REDACTED] is continued. . . . We have noted a considerable increase in security-mindedness on the part of the recent [REDACTED] graduates and particularly an awareness of CIA's requirement for compartmentation, a feature infrequently practiced in the military. . . . We are inclined to believe that the USEUCOM officers (whose interests are highly parochial) received at [REDACTED] much more information on a global basis than they needed to know. . . . We feel that a shorter course as far as the European theater is concerned would be acceptable. . . . We note that although the military frequently uses a general officer to introduce a briefing, the substance is usually given by a junior . . . it seems likely that the officers attending [REDACTED] would be content with a course presented by junior CIA people provided an aura of seniority was maintained by having a senior supergrade introduce or otherwise oversee the proceedings. . . . We feel strongly that there would be an adverse reaction on the part of the military should [REDACTED] be discontinued and if no substitute form of briefings was established. . . . We agree that CIA stands to gain more from [REDACTED] than does the military, and we feel that our job here would be much more difficult without it." (Mr. [REDACTED])

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b. "In general, we believe Project [REDACTED] in its present form is too broad-brush, undoubtedly earning some friends in key positions and giving needed information on CIA to officers who have thereby been made more effective and perhaps more understanding. However, we feel that the broad-brush approach has had some deleterious effect in furnishing data on CIA beyond each individual's need to know, and in limited cases to officers who have used such information to strengthen their previous antagonistic attitudes. . . . We believe that Project [REDACTED] should be carefully phased out, avoiding the possibility of straining military relations by sudden cancellation. Sudden withdrawal of the project, now fairly well known among key military personnel, might be misinterpreted. We therefore feel that some thought might be given to one more

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course offered during calendar year 1966, with a limited number of personnel and a decreased scope of presentations. . . . Thereafter, it is our opinion that briefing of key military personnel should be done, both in Headquarters and in the field, by selected officers. . . . (Mr. [REDACTED])

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c. " . . . a discontinuance of Project [REDACTED] would be detrimental to the CIA relationship with the Armed Services. . . . In a period of almost five and one half years service with three different unified Command Headquarters and COMUSMACV, [I have] found that all officers who have attended [REDACTED] have a better understanding of CIA capabilities and limitations and are fully cooperative in providing day-to-day support. . . . Officers who have attended Project [REDACTED] always comment on the high caliber of the speakers. . . . The military officers selected to attend are normally assigned to important billets in the JCS, Service Headquarters or Joint Commands overseas. In [my] experience their selection for attendance is based on the relationship of their positions with a need to know requirement for knowledge of the functions of CIA. [I have] found that the officers who have attended [REDACTED] are appreciative and extremely conscious of the sensitivity of the knowledge gained." (Mr. [REDACTED])

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d. "While serving this Agency in [REDACTED] (1960-1961) I made every effort to have those officers attend Project [REDACTED] with whom I was in daily contact. I felt then and now that those officers were of greater assistance to me as a CIA representative after they had attended [REDACTED] . . . Often times, when serving overseas, invitations to attend meetings, access to military correspondence and plans, appointments to meet people of importance to CIA interests, and inclusion in orientation trips, etc., were arranged spontaneously for me by military contacts because they immediately recognized a CIA interest. On the other hand, a lack of this knowledge of CIA by my military contacts resulted in missed opportunities and a generally negative and suspicious attitude towards whatever I wished to do. . . . Project [REDACTED] has created a cooperative atmosphere between CIA and the military that is desirable to better serve the national interest in the field of intelligence. As recently as 26 August, CIA was invited for the first time to attend a military planning conference in the Pentagon involving the preparation of an annex of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. Although CIA has little to contribute to this plan, this is an opportunity for CIA to know what this important segment of the Intelligence Community is considering as future objectives in the intelligence field. Elimination of Project [REDACTED] might halt this healthy trend of cooperation between CIA and the military which is so necessary to the efficient and effective fulfillment of national intelligence goals." [REDACTED]

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e. "I am confident in the case of all of the foregoing officers /of five cited, one was mentioned in Annex A/ that their participating in Project [redacted] has led directly to their cooperative and favorable attitude and respect for CIA. In view of my experience in dealing with these officers, it is recommended that Project [redacted] be continued." (Mr. [redacted])

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f. "My outstanding impression of their attitudes /i.e., of the officers attending [redacted] courses 5, 6, 7 and 8/ was their sincerity as participants and their sympathy to the Agency when our problems were explained." (Mr. [redacted])

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g. "I have concluded that the greatest value of Project [redacted] to the Agency has come from the opportunity it offers to correct a number of serious misconceptions and misunderstandings held by military officers. Many of these officers are in or will soon be in positions where they may be in direct support of our Clandestine Services abroad, who are the immediate recipients of Agency intelligence reports and therefore set the requirements, or who are engaged in joint Agency-military operations or planning activities. Often these misconceptions, gleaned only from the press, are consciously or unknowingly the basis for hostility toward the Agency and especially its clandestine field personnel who are suspected of being unnecessarily 'spooky.'" (Mr. [redacted])

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h. "After giving the matter some long thoughts, I strongly recommend that the Project [redacted] should be retained even if reduced to one week and cut in size. . . . [redacted] helps to offset with a highly selective group the continued bad press which CIA is receiving and to offset the reputation for being 'high and mighty' which occasionally causes some resentment at the field command level. It is remarkable the difference between the measure of cooperation obtained from some 'oddball' request from Washington, where there is even a glimmer of understanding as to why this aircraft or this ship has to be diverted from its basic training mission. . . . A universal comment of LANTCOM officers returning from the course has been the caliber of the speakers. 'We really got the first team' expresses their sentiments. . . . the sticky business of command relationships in a contingency situation was clarified to these LANTCOM officers by [redacted] in a manner that made the subsequent DOM/REP contingency a little easier for them to understand. . . . One officer said [redacted] was too long. Other than this there has been nothing but praise and continued interest on the part of the officers occupying the specialized positions mentioned. . . . There has never been anything but the most meticulous attention to CIA security in LANTCOM. . . . If the number is cut down, I would recommend

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that [REDACTED] be limited to officers from the field commands. This is where the action is and where the equipment is. Regardless of all the high level clearance in Washington, this is the level at which the cooperation begins to mean something in terms of getting that aircraft or that helicopter or that ship pronto without waiting for the matter to clear through channels." (Mr. [REDACTED])

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i. "Generally [REDACTED] is a very worthwhile orientation for military officers in planning or joint operational areas. Most military officers gain an appreciation for CIA's role and relationships with the military which results in harmonious relations with CIA personnel in the field. Some military officers become very well disposed toward CIA and are particularly helpful in the field as a result of [REDACTED]. A few officers, probably prejudiced before attending [REDACTED], do not react favorably to the course. These few, however, may be present in any course for whatever purpose." (Mr. [REDACTED])

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j. "As the central point for processing CIA covert support requests and achieving coordination between CIA-Defense on joint endeavors (as Vietnam), SACSA provides a practical example of values from [REDACTED]. The officers of SACSA must show appreciation and concern for CIA operational needs and security, and in my experience [REDACTED] has contributed to such an attitude. As I have taken a hand in CIA requests that rise from SACSA for attention to topside OSD, I have felt that [REDACTED] graduates were more understanding and cooperative. . . . It may be pertinent in your assessment of [REDACTED] to consider the importance, from a CIA point of view, of later assignments given [REDACTED] graduates. A selective sampling of such assignments is appended in belief that it indicates the potential investment in positive attitudes and a favorable appreciation of CIA as these officers fulfill key roles with a Chairman/JCS, or a regional CINC or similar staffs. [The above selective sampling, on 76 officers of all services, is available in WPS-7. . . You can be assured that Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance endorses the concept of [REDACTED]. He believes that properly handled it can minimize negatives in CIA-DOD relations and facilitate our teamwork in intelligence and covert operations at all levels. . . . As a personal observation, I feel this kind of CIA/DOD cross-fertilization is sound. In my area of activity I move that [REDACTED] candidates include more officers who are tabbed to be military assistants in or liaison with the Office of the Secretary of Defense." (Mr. [REDACTED])

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